When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. Pp. 5–14. (a) Two inquiries guide interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded public employee speech. The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.
(b) Proper application of the Court’s precedents leads to the conclusion that the First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities.
(c) Exposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance, and various measures have been adopted to protect employees and provide checks on supervisors who would order unlawful or otherwise inappropriate actions. These include federal and state whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes and, for government attorneys, rules of conduct and constitutional obligations apart from the First Amendment. However, the Court’s precedents do not support the existence of a constitutional cause of action behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job.
If the court were to decide that Quincy was acting as an employee rather than a citizen at the board meeting, then it doesn't look Quincy has a chance. This, of course, will lead to an interesting slippery slope to what degree of activity employment contracts encompass (particularly for adjuncts). I'll leave the legal debate to others.
We are, as Bender from Futurama says, boned.